What to make of the latest row between China and America over Taiwan?

原文：What to make of the latest row between China and America over Taiwan?

译文：对台军售会如何影响中美关系？

Feb 2nd 2010 | WASHINGTON, DC | From The Economist online

IS IT a crisis or just (show) business as usual? With China and America, it can be hard to tell. Almost immediately after the United States said that it intended to sell more than $6 billion-worth of arms to Taiwan, the Chinese went into a spin. They summoned the American ambassador to denounce this interference in China’s “internal affairs” (Taiwan is part of the mainland, says the government in Beijing), threatened to cut off military ties with the United States and said they would impose sanctions on American firms involved in the Taiwan deal.

这很难说此次这中美之间的是一场危机亦或仅仅如以往一样还是一场商业秀。几乎紧跟在美国抛出对台湾的六十亿美元军售计划之后，中国就做出了回应。他们召唤了美国驻华大使来谴责这件干预中国“内政”的事情（北京政府强调台湾是大陆的一部分），并且威胁要中止双方的军事合作，以及要制裁那些出售给台湾军火的公司。

None of this looks good for the world’s most consequential relationship. From global warming to the sickly world economy to stopping nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran, co-operation between the established superpower and the rising one is vital to world stability. Why should either want to jeopardise this relationship?

上述的种种情况使得目前世界上最重要的双边关系显得非常糟糕。从全球变暖问题，到解决经济危机，再到防止朝鲜和伊朗的核扩散，两个超级大国的合作对世界稳定是至关重要的。但是为什么它们都想要损害这种关系呢？

That question has produced several theories. One is that China’s spritely economy is making it less afraid of conflict with a tiring America, especially when it thinks that “core” interests such as its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan or Tibet are at stake. The other is that America timed the Taiwan arms sale in part to punish China—for its shabby treatment of Barack Obama during last November’s presidential visit to Beijing, for its foot-dragging at December’s Copenhagen climate summit and for its reluctance to support new United Nations sanctions on Iran. Of course, neither theory excludes the other and bits of both may be true. But a third possibility is that there is in fact less to this “crisis” than meets the eye.

这个问题的原因已经有好几种理论来解释。一种是中国生机勃勃的经济状况让他不惧怕与美国产生冲突，特别当触及到中国的核心问题，比如对台湾和西藏的主权问题受到危机的时候。另一种说法是美国定时向台湾出售军火是针对中国的惩罚的一部分——为了报复十一月欧巴马总统来华访问时的不公正待遇、十二月在哥本哈根拖了美国的后腿以及在联合国制裁伊朗上的勉强态度。当然了，没有一种理论把另一种排除在外而且它们都有部分是正确的。但是第三种可能是这种“危机”没看上去那么严重。

America is obliged under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 to provide the island with the arms it needs to defend itself. America and China both knew that the United States would announce the package at some time and that China would vehemently oppose it, as it always does. The package includes some sophisticated weapons, such as Black Hawk helicopters and Harpoon missiles, but it does not include F-16 fighters that the Taiwanese would dearly like. As to the timing, says a senior administration official, “this is one of those issues where the timing is never right.” It certainly would not have been clever to announce the sale immediately before or after last year’s presidential goodwill visit to China.

美国是在承担1979年出台的《台湾关系法》规定的提供台湾军事装备来保卫台湾岛的义务。美国和中国都知道美国一定会在某时提出军售计划而中国会像往常一样激烈反对。军售计划中包括了一些尖端武器，例如黑鹰直升机和鱼叉导弹，但是并没有包括台湾人最渴望得到的F—16战斗机。关于（出售的）时机，一位资深管理官员说：“这是那些永远等不到正确的时候的议题之一。”在去年总统抱有良好意愿的访问前后宣布出售计划确实是不明智的。

If America’s announcement was expected, so was the indignant Chinese response. Denunciation and the cancellation of some military-co-operation meetings is in keeping with previous Chinese reactions. A new element this time was the public threat of Chinese sanctions against American firms involved in the Taiwan deal, but most of these have little or no business in China. One big exception is Boeing, which is huge in China. But for that reason it is unlikely that the Chinese will follow up on this particular threat.

如果美国如预期的宣布军售计划，中国也会愤慨的回应。对美国的谴责和军事合作的取消也如中国先前的反应一样。这次一个新戏码是中国会制裁那些涉及到此次军售的军火公司，但是这些公司大多数与中国仅有少量或完全没有关系，除了波音公司，它在中国有巨大的销售额。但也正如这个原因，中国不会实施这个特别的制裁。

If the Taiwan weapons spat blows over, American officials will hail what they nowadays call the more “mature” relationship they have nurtured with China during Mr Obama’s first year. But many tests lie ahead. Some are mainly symbolic, such as a forthcoming meeting between Mr Obama and Tibet’s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, which the Americans postponed last year to prevent it souring the president’s China trip. Others are more concrete, such as China’s reluctance to go along with new sanctions on Iran or to respond to America’s pleas to revalue the yuan. A world-shaking falling-out between China and America is always possible. But the falling-out over the Taiwan arms package is probably not it.

如果对台湾军售的争执能平稳度过，美国官方会称赞他们今天成为更“成熟”的在欧巴马总统第一年任期内培养出与中国的关系。但是还有很多考验摆在眼前。一些是象征性的问题，比如欧巴马总统将与西藏的精神领袖达赖喇嘛会面，此次见面是美国为了防止欧巴马访华变味而推迟到今年的。其他的问题则更加有实质性，比如中国不情愿对伊朗实施制裁和回应对美国要求人民币升值的要求。世界会因为中美关系可能的失和而颤抖，但是两国因为台湾军售而失和则几无可能。